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Abstract
In this paper, we examined reactions to situations in which, although one is not personally involved,
one could see oneself connected to either the perpetrators or the victims of unfair behavior. We
manipulated participants’ similarity and measured their identiﬁcation to either one of two groups
which participants later learned was the victim or the perpetrator of harmful behavior. As predicted,
making salient similarities to the victims lead participants to: 1) appraise the perpetrator’s behavior
as more unfair; 2) experience more anger; and 3) be more likely to take action against it and less prone
to show support for it as a function of their level of identiﬁcation with their salient ingroup. In sharp
contrast, focusing participants’ attention on their similarities to the perpetrators reversed this pattern
of ﬁndings: Compared to high identiﬁers, low identiﬁers appraised the behavior as more unfair than
high identiﬁers, which made them feel angry (and guilty) and less likely to show support for the
perpetrator’s behavior. The data also provide strong support for a mediational model in which
appraisal of the situation colors the emotional reaction which in turn orients action tendencies. We
discuss the implications of our ﬁndings for the issue of group-based emotions. Copyright# 2006 John
Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Imagine the following situation. Suppose you are a student in the state where you are a resident. This
state is experiencing great ﬁnancial difﬁculty and therefore the State Representatives are actively
searching for new funding opportunities to bring in additional money. One solution the regents decide
on is that out-of-state students should pay an additional 35% increase in their tuition, which is an
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extraordinary single year increase for a publicly funded institution. This income would go directly to
the state and beneﬁt the entire population of the state. How would you feel about the behavior of the
State Representatives? To some extent you may feel similar to the victims of this proposal, who are
students like you, but also to the responsible representatives, who are residents of your state.
In this paper, we examine reactions to situations in which, although one is not personally involved,
one could see oneself connected to either the perpetrators or the victims of unfair behavior. We argue
that the extent to which people judge a behavior to be unfair, and the extent to which they feel angry or
not and intend to do something about it or not, depends on the relative salience of their similarities to
either the perpetrators or the victims. In other words, the way observers appraise a particular instance
of intergroup behavior and react emotionally about it is a function of perceivers’ salient social identity.
To come back to our example, the solution imagined by the State Representatives in order to address
the budget problem faced by the state is likely to be appraised differently and to generate different
emotional reactions when observers see themselves primarily as students (like the victims, the out-of-
state students) or when they think of themselves in terms of state residents (like the perpetrators, the
State Representatives).
Presumably, a focus on the similarities with the victims would increase the perception of the
behavior as unfair and anger would be the consequence. In contrast, when the links with the
perpetrators are being stressed, the behavior is likely to be seen as justiﬁed and chances are that
they are not angry. Next to the impact of group membership on emotional reactions via the appraisal of
the situation, an additional and indeed intriguing question concerns the moderating role of identiﬁca-
tion. That is, we would expect the above ﬁndings to emerge more readily among people who value
their membership in either one of these groups. These are the key predictions that we address in the
present study.
Anger and Intergroup Relations
According to appraisal theories of emotions (e.g. Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989), an emotion
such as anger is most likely to occur when someone else’s behavior is perceived to be intentionally
unfair and people feel they have the power to do something about it. If a situation is appraised in such a
way that it arouses anger, people will be more likely to take action against the perpetrator than when it
is appraised in alternative ways. Frijda et al. (1989) argued that unfair behavior is only likely to arouse
anger when the observer perceives the situation to be self-relevant. What does this mean for situations
in which the observer is not directly involved? Can one be angry on behalf of one’s group? Recent
research suggests that this is indeed possible.
Smith (1993; see also Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002) proposed a theory
of differentiated intergroup emotions, in which he integrated insights from appraisal theories of
emotions (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and lessons from social
identity theory (Tajfel, 1981) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987). In line with social
identity theory and self-categorization theory, he argued that group membership can exert an
important inﬂuence on emotion. This is because under some circumstances ingroups and ingroup
memberships become part of the self. In line with appraisal theories, Smith (1993) argued that
different contexts may elicit different emotions among ingroup members because in those different
circumstances appraisals will not be similar. So, when the situation is such that perceivers see a
particular group as an important ingroup and it happens that ingroup members are treated unfairly
and suffer from the behavior of some outgroup, they could feel angry. Moreover, research by Van
Zomeren, Spears, Fisher, and Leach (2004) has shown that such group-based anger affects
collective actions tendencies.
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The Victim’s Perspective
According to Smith (1993), people experience emotions on behalf of members of their ingroup.
According to the social identity approach/self-categorization theory, the way people perceive the
social world in general and themselves in particular can be quite ﬂexible. People may perceive
themselves as members of a variety of groups as a function of, among other factors, the salience of
contextual information. This simple yet powerful idea led Gordijn, Wigboldus, and Yzerbyt (2001)
to propose that experiencing anger when seeing other people being unfairly treated could vary as a
function of whether the similarities between oneself with these victims were made salient.
In order to test their hypothesis, Gordijn and colleagues (2001) manipulated the context such
that the victims of unfair behavior were seen as members of the ingroup or as members of the
outgroup. They did so by relying on the crossed categorization paradigm (see Brown & Turner,
1979; Urban & Miller, 1998; Vanbeselaere, 1991). In the crossed categorization paradigm, a
speciﬁc target person is part of the outgroup on one dimension and part of the ingroup on another
dimension. By focusing attention of observers on their similarities to the target, the target will be
seen as belonging to the ingroup. In other words, the observers will see themselves and the target
as belonging to the same group. However, when the attention of observers is focused on their
differences to the target, this target person will be seen as belonging to the outgroup. In line with
the predictions by Gordijn and colleagues (2001), the results indicated that when observers focused
on similarities to the victims of the unfair behavior, observers felt angrier and less happy than
when focused on differences from the victims. In this last case, they took the perspective of
outsiders.
Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) examined emotional reactions with respect to a
real life event by using a similar manipulation of categorization. Speciﬁcally, they examined to what
extent people from the Netherlands and from Belgium were likely to experience fear after being
reminded of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001. The data showed that making
similarities to the American victims salient albeit in a subtle way was conducive to more fear among
the Dutch and Belgium participants than when differences were made salient to them. In addition,
participants were more likely to show behavioral intentions and actual behaviors that can be related to
fear when similarities rather than differences to the victims were made salient to them.
One important question regarding the above results concerns the existence of potential
moderators of the emotional reactions. Is it the case that people always feel emotions on behalf
of the ingroup when their similarities are made salient to them or could it be that some people react
more strongly than others? Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003) found evidence that
there can be differences in reactions between people on the basis of their identiﬁcation with the
group. That is, the salience of the similarity to the victims was found to generate angry feelings
among observers of unfair behavior to the extent that these observers strongly identiﬁed with the
relevant category. This is in line with self-categorization theory, according to which people are
likely to self-stereotype not only in reaction to transient features of the situation but also as a
function of their chronic level of identiﬁcation with the group. High identiﬁers are expected to
adopt the prototypical behavior of the ingroup to a larger extent than low identiﬁers (Branscombe &
Wann, 1992).
The Perpetrator’s Perspective
So far, our work focused on the way people’s reactions to victims varied as a function of whether
participants were led to categorize themselves as members of the same or a different group than the
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victims (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002; see also, Yzerbyt, in press; Yzerbyt,
Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, in press). But what happens when observers realize that
they belong to the same group as the perpetrator of the unfair behavior? If our model is correct, a focus
on their similarities to the perpetrators should lead people to feel emotions that are likely to be similar
to those experienced by the perpetrators.
Most research that has focused on the perspective of the perpetrator has investigated the
occurrence of collective guilt (e.g. Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Doosje, Branscombe,
Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). For example, Doosje et al. (1998, Study
2) gave Dutch participants information about the Dutch colonial occupation of Indonesia. When
both positive and negative things were said about the Dutch colonial history, people who did not
strongly identify with being Dutch felt guilty about this and wanted to compensate the victims,
even though they themselves were not personally involved. High identiﬁers did not feel guilty at
all. In fact, high identiﬁers only felt guilty when the Dutch history was presented as strongly
and unambiguously negative. So, the participants experiencing the most collective guilt were those
who identiﬁed the least with the group. According to Doosje et al. (2002) high identiﬁers are less
likely to feel guilty about their group’s behavior and more likely to defend the group. The reason
for this is that high identiﬁers are more inclined than low identiﬁers to see their group in a positive
view and they are less likely to accept negative aspects of their group when confronted with
information that portrays their group negatively. This is especially possible when the information
about the ingroup is not clearly just negative. Low identiﬁers on the other hand, are more likely
to acknowledge the negative aspects of their group, as they feel less commitment towards the
group.
Victim versus Perpetrator Perspective
The research we have so far discussed only examined the affective and conative consequences of
perceiving negative behavior from the point of view of either the victims or the perpetrators, and not
even within the same research paradigm. However, quite often people may be connected by some
degree to both the victims and the perpetrators of unfair behavior. How will they react to unfair
behavior under such circumstances? The present work brings together insights from previous research
regarding emotional consequences of salient similarities to victims of negative behavior (e.g. Gordijn
et al., 2001; Dumont et al., 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 2003), and research on emotional consequences of
being a member of the group that is the perpetrator of negative behavior (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998), by
examining both within the same research paradigm.
We propose that when the context allows for either one of both identities to be activated, making
salient similarities to the victims will lead observers: to 1) appraise the perpetrator’s behavior as more
unfair; 2) experience more anger; and 3) be more likely to take action against it, as a function of their
level of identiﬁcation with the ingroup. In sharp contrast, focusing perceivers’ attention on their
similarities to the perpetrators should reverse this pattern, as in this case only low identiﬁers: 1)
appraise the perpetrator’s behavior as more unfair; 2) experience more anger; and 3) are more likely to
take action against it.
We further claim that the interactive impact of group membership and identiﬁcation on emotions
and action tendencies should be mediated by perceivers’ appraisals of the situation. Evidence for
such a pattern would conﬁrm the presence of mediated moderation (Baron & Kenny, 1986;
Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2004; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2000; Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004) and
would be entirely in line with our view that group-based emotions are indeed triggered by speciﬁc
appraisals.
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METHOD
Participants and Design
Twenty-four male and 62 female undergraduates of the University of Colorado at Boulder, all
Colorado residents, participated in the experiment in order to partially fulﬁll course requirements
(mean age¼ 18.95, SD¼ 1.15). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions in
which attention was focused on either their similarities to the victims or on their similarities to the
perpetrators.
Experimental Materials
A story was developed which described harmful behavior of members of a group toward members
of another group. In this story, it was explained that the State of Colorado was experiencing
ﬁnancial difﬁculty and that Colorado representatives were actively searching for new funding
opportunities to bring in additional money to support its funding obligation to public programs. It
was further said that given the attractiveness of the universities for out-of-state students, the regents
began to discuss a controversial policy that would have out-of-state students paying an additional
35% increase in their tuition, which would then go directly to the state and beneﬁt the entire
population of Colorado. Moreover, it was said that a majority of the State House of Representatives
was expected to approve the motion. It was also described that upon hearing these plans, the
associations representing out-of-state students declared that they were shocked by this obvious case
of discrimination against out-of-state students, and that they immediately initiated an active lobby
campaign against the proposal. The story was presented as a recent newspaper article that appeared
in the Denver Post. It should be noted that raising tuition costs was timely given the budget crisis
faced in Colorado at the time we ran the study. Moreover, it is fairly common for out-of-state
students to pay more for tuition than residents, although, of course, a 35% increase in tuition is
quite extreme.
In a pilot study, this story was presented to 20 undergraduates of Colorado University who were
out-of-state students in order to examine to what extent the story elicited anger rather than other
emotions among the victims. First, respondents were reminded that they were students (in comparison
to non-students), and then they were asked to report the extent to which they felt angry, sad, afraid,
guilty, and happy on a series of nine-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9
(¼ absolutely). To examine whether the story inﬂuenced feelings, we conducted an ANOVA with
feelings (angry, sad, afraid, guilty, and happy) as a within-subject factor. This analysis revealed the
presence of a main effect for feelings, F (4, 76)¼ 30.21, p< 0.0001. Further analyses showed that
respondents felt more angry (M¼ 7.50, SD¼ 1.50) than sad (M¼ 5.30, SD¼ 2.03), F (1, 19)¼ 22.65,
p< 0.01, afraid (M¼ 4.75, SD¼ 2.40), F (1, 19)¼ 36.03, p< 0.01, guilty (M¼ 2.95, SD¼ 2.28),
F (1, 19)¼ 62.96, p< 0.01, or happy (M¼ 1.80, SD¼ 1.11), F (1, 19)¼ 110.04, p< 0.01.
We also measured on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9 (¼ absolutely) the
extent to which the State House of Representatives (the perpetrator) was perceived to behave in a
unfair manner with respect to the out-of-state students (victims). As expected, the situation was seen as
extremely unfair to the students (M¼ 8.15, SD¼ 1.23). An additional nine-point scale ranging from 1
(¼ absolutely not) to 9 (¼ absolutely) revealed that most respondents wanted to take action against
the proposal (M¼ 7.0, SD¼ 2.62). Together, these ﬁndings suggest that the story can be used to induce
anger.
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Procedure and Independent Variables
Participants were invited in groups to a classroom where they were given the questionnaire. In the
ﬁrst few pages of the questionnaire, we manipulated participant’s categorization as perpetrators or
victims. Speciﬁcally, the questionnaire was said to be distributed either among Colorado residents
and non-residents or among students and non-students. The former instruction was chosen in order
to make salient similarities of the participants with the group that later turned out to be the
perpetrators (Colorado State House of Representatives). As for the latter instruction, it was
intended to make salient similarities of the participants with the group that later turned out to be
the victims (non-residential students). Moreover, in order to enhance categorization, and also to
measure individual levels of identiﬁcation with the salient group, participants were given a group
identiﬁcation scale comprising three nine-point rating scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9
(¼ absolutely). Depending on the experimental condition, the identiﬁcation scale was written with
reference to the group of students or to the group of Colorado residents. Speciﬁc items were ‘Being
a student/from Colorado is a key aspect of who I am’, ‘I identify with other students/people from
Colorado’, ‘Being a student/from Colorado means a lot to me’. Then, in order to emphasize the
categorization context even more participants in the perpetrator condition were asked to compare
Colorado residents and non-residents on a number of traits. Participants in the victim condition had
to do the same task for students and non-students. It should be noted that at this moment,
participants did not yet know who the victims and perpetrators were, as the participants had not
read the newspaper article yet.
After this, participants in both conditions were asked to read an article that allegedly had appeared
in the Denver Post newspaper. In this article it is made clear who the perpetrators are (Colorado State
House of Representatives) and who the victims are (non-residential students). This article was
described in the ‘Experimental Materials’ section.
Dependent Variables
After reading the information contained in the newspaper article, participants had to rate their
appraisals of the situation on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9 (¼ absolutely).
To this end, we selected a series of features that would allow differentiating the evaluation of the
harmful behavior as being unfair or, in contrast, justiﬁed. Speciﬁcally, participants were asked to what
extent they thought the Colorado State House of Representatives proposal to increase tuition for out-
of-state students by 35% was fair (recoded), harmless (recoded), normal (recoded), rational (recoded),
unjust, prejudicial, and harsh in order to measure to what extent they appraised the proposal as unfair.
Next, they had to rate on a series of 9-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9
(¼ absolutely) how they felt about the Colorado State House of Representatives proposal to increase
tuition for out-of-state students by 35%. They were asked to what extent they felt anger (i.e. angered,
outraged, annoyed, irritated) about the proposal. We also measured the extent to which they felt guilty
(i.e. guilty, remorseful), ashamed (ashamed, embarrassed), happy (i.e. happy, pleased, delighted,
amused), worried (i.e. worried, afraid, anxious, alarmed, distressed), and sad (i.e. sad, miserable,
depressed) to examine other negative and positive emotions as well. However, we did not have any
speciﬁc predictions about these measures.
After this, participants had to rate on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9
(¼ absolutely) what they wanted to do about the Colorado State House proposal. The questionnaire
contained a series of behavioral intentions aimed at capturing participants’ behavioral reactions
associated with support or disapproval. Speciﬁcally, participants were asked to what extent they
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wanted to support the proposal, take action against the proposal, do nothing about it, show their
sympathy for the out-of-state students, show their support for the State House representatives, and ﬁnd
out how one could prevent this proposal from being enforced.
The last measure concerned identiﬁcation with state of residence and with being a student. All
participants had to rate on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (¼ absolutely not) to 9 (¼ absolutely)
whether they felt strong ties with people from their state, whether being from their state is important to
them, and whether they would mention that they are from their state, when describing themselves.
Similar questions were asked with respect to being a student. Finally, participants were debriefed,
thanked, and dismissed.
RESULTS
Initial Identiﬁcation with Salient Group
The three identiﬁcation items measured at the onset of the study, as part of the manipulation were
combined in a scale (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.84). A one-way ANOVA using categorization, i.e. victim v.
perpetrator, as the between-subjects factor revealed that the identiﬁcation of participants with the
victims, that is, the group of students (M¼ 7.10, SD¼ 1.50), was stronger than the identiﬁcation with
the perpetrators, that is, the Colorado residents (M¼ 5.52, SD¼ 2.17), F (1, 84)¼ 15.39, p< 0.01.
Because we were interested in the relative impact of identiﬁcation in the two conditions, we
standardized the identiﬁcation measure within each condition when we used it as a moderator variable
in the regression analyses.1
Unfairness Appraisal
The seven items were combined into a scale (Cronbach’s alpha¼ 0.85). We tested our predictions by
means of a multiple regression analysis using the unfairness scale as the criterion and categorization
(contrast coded: victims¼1, perpetrators¼ 1), identiﬁcation, and the interaction between these two
variables as the predictors. The only reliable predictor of unfairness was the interaction between
identiﬁcation and categorization, ¼0.30, t¼2.79, p< 0.01. This interaction is displayed in
Figure 1. Following Aiken and West (1991), we selected data points for estimating the regression lines
at þ / 1 standard deviation for predictors of the regression equation. As can be seen, when
similarities to the victims were salient, higher levels of identiﬁcation tended to induce participants
to appraise the situation as more unfair, ¼ 0.28, t¼ 1.80, p< 0.08. In contrast, when similarities to
the perpetrators were salient, higher levels of identiﬁcation had participants appraise the situation as
less unfair (¼0.32, t¼  2.16, p< 0.05).
Emotional Reactions
The 20 emotion items were submitted to a principal component analysis. Because we had speciﬁcally
constructed the emotion scale to include ﬁve different emotions, we performed a varimax rotation by
1We also ran the analyses by ranking participants on identiﬁcation within each condition and then centering it (Judd, personal
communication). The results show a similar pattern.
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imposing ﬁve factors.2 The factor solution did not reveal the ﬁve factors that we intended to measure.
As can be seen in Table 1, we found a ‘happiness’ factor (happy, delighted, pleased, and amused:
eigenvalue¼ 3.0; explained variance¼ 15%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.83), an ‘anger’ factor (angrered,
outraged, annoyed: eigenvalue¼ 2.69; explained variance¼ 13.45%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.80), a ‘guilt’
factor (guilty, remorseful, ashamed, and embarrassed: eigenvalue¼ 3.27; explained variance¼
16.33%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.81), a factor, which we named ‘worry’ (afraid, alarmed, distressed,
depressed, worried: eigenvalue¼ 4.15; explained variance¼ 20.76%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.88), and
Figure 1. Appraisal of proposal being unfair as a function of identiﬁcation and categorization. Note: To avoid
misinterpretation one ought to remember that identiﬁcation is standardized within conditions. This means that
identiﬁcation level in this ﬁgure is to be understood relative to the mean of that speciﬁc group. The same remark
holds for Figures 2–4
2We relied on Varimax rotations. One could argue that in the case of emotions an oblique rotation is more appropriate to use as an
exploratory tool in order to allow for the relatedness of the emotion items to occur. We thank the reviewers for suggesting this.
However, it should be noted that the factor structure revealed by the Varimax rotation was strictly similar to the one suggested by
the oblique rotation.
Table 1. Rotated factor matrix: Emotions
Happiness Anger Guilt Concern Sadness
Happy 0.685 0.443 0.197 0.188 0.218
Amused 0.776 0.014 0.047 0.026 0.228
Delighted 0.876 0.023 0.060 0.011 0.098
Pleased 0.831 0.189 0.089 0.026 0.215
Angry 0.257 0.640 0.083 0.215 0.493
Annoyed 0.236 0.598 0.112 0.414 0.083
Outraged 0.128 0.745 0.263 0.319 0.163
Guilty 0.074 0.216 0.750 0.314 0.191
Embarrassed 0.016 0.216 0.733 0.036 0.423
Remorseful 0.026 0.106 0.745 0.221 0.116
Ashamed 0.126 0.407 0.721 0.151 0.135
Afraid 0.013 0.054 0.440 0.684 0.046
Alarm 0.119 0.096 0.111 0.740 0.404
Worried 0.079 0.157 0.108 0.878 0.095
Distressed 0.086 0.405 0.188 0.732 0.011
Depressed 0.167 0.340 0.235 0.698 0.075
Sad 0.073 0.287 0.197 0.238 0.782
Anxious 0.333 0.258 0.504 0.465 0.290
Miserable 0.247 0.389 0.537 0.490 0.026
Irritated 0.277 0.497 0.246 0.549 0.216
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax.
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sadness (one item) loaded on the last factor (eigenvalue¼ 1.60; explained variance¼ 8.01%). Three
items (anxious, miserable and irritated) did not clearly load on any one of the factors and were not
examined further.
We tested our predictions by means of a multiple regression analysis using each of the emotion
factors as the criterion and categorization (contrast coded: victims¼  1, perpetrators¼ 1), identi-
ﬁcation, and the interaction between these two variables as the predictors. As expected, the only
reliable predictor of anger was the interaction between identiﬁcation and categorization, ¼0.23,
t¼  2.16, p< 0.05. This interaction is displayed in Figure 2. As can be seen, there was a tendency for
identiﬁcation to go hand in hand with anger when similarities to the victims were made salient,
¼ 0.25, t¼ 1.63, p< 0.11. When similarities to the perpetrators were salient, identiﬁcation was
associated with lower levels of anger, ¼0.21, t¼  1.43, p< 0.15, although this was not
statistically signiﬁcant.
The only predictor of guilt that was again the interaction between identiﬁcation and categorization,
¼0.21, t¼  1.93, p< 0.06. When similarities to the victims were salient, the trend was for
identiﬁcation to be associated with guilt, ¼ 0.24, t¼ 1.56, p< 0.12. Identiﬁcation did not inﬂuence
guilt when similarities to the perpetrators were salient, although lower levels of identiﬁcation seemed
associated with higher levels of guilt, ¼0.17, t¼  1.17, p< 0.25.
We also examined the correlation between guilt and anger. When similarities to the perpetrators
were made salient, the correlation between these two emotions was signiﬁcant, r(42)¼ 0.59, p< 0.01.
In contrast, when similarities to the victims were made salient, the correlation between guilt and anger
was not signiﬁcant for this group, r (40)¼ 0.25, p< 0.11. In order to examine whether the correlation
between guilt and anger was signiﬁcantly stronger in the perpetrators’ condition than in the victims’
condition, we performed a regression analysis in which guilt (centered), categorization (contrast
coded: victims¼  1, perpetrators¼ 1), and the interaction between guilt and categorization are
entered as predictors and anger as the dependent variable. The interaction between guilt and
categorization signiﬁcantly predicted anger, ¼ 0.19, t¼ 1.96, p< 0.05.
With respect to happiness, we found a signiﬁcant main effect of categorization, which indicates that
people felt happier in the perpetrator condition than in the victim condition (¼ 0.23, t¼ 2.15,
p< 0.05). With respect to worry or to sadness none of the predictors was reliable.
Action Intentions
The six action intention items were submitted to a principal component analysis followed by a varimax
rotation. As can be seen in Table 2, we found two factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1: 1) ‘action
Figure 2. Anger as a function of identiﬁcation and categorization
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against proposal’ (ﬁnd out how to prevent, want to take action against, do nothing (recoded):
eigenvalue¼ 2.36; explained variance¼ 39%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.83), and 2) ‘support for proposal’
(show support for State House representatives, support proposal: eigenvalue¼ 2.29; explained
variance¼ 38%; Cronbach’s ¼ 0.83). One item (show sympathy for the out-of-state students) did
not clearly load on either factor, so we disregarded it.
We tested our predictions with respect to ‘action against proposal’ and ‘support for proposal’ scale
by means of multiple regression analyses using categorization (contrast coded: victims¼1,
perpetrators¼ 1), identiﬁcation, and the interaction between these two variables as predictors. The
only reliable predictor of action against proposal was the interaction between identiﬁcation and
categorization, ¼0.25, t¼  2.42, p< 0.05. This interaction is displayed in Figure 3. As can be
seen, when similarities to the victims were salient, higher levels of identiﬁcation were related to
stronger willingness to take action against the proposal, ¼ 0.44, t¼ 2.93, p< 0.01. In contrast, when
similarities to the perpetrators were salient, identiﬁcation did not inﬂuence taking action against the
proposal, ¼0.07, t¼  0.47, p< 0.64.
The only reliable predictor of support for proposal was the interaction between identiﬁcation and
categorization, ¼ 0.26, t¼ 2.45, p< 0.05. This interaction is displayed in Figure 4. As can be seen,
when similarities to the victims were salient, higher levels of identiﬁcation seemed to induce less
support for the proposal than low levels of identiﬁcation, ¼0.18, t¼  1.21, p< 0.23, although
this was not statistically signiﬁcant. The opposite pattern emerged when similarities to the perpetrators
were made salient. In this case, higher identiﬁcation was associated with more support for the proposal
than lower identiﬁcation, ¼ 0.34, t¼ 2.27, p< 0.05.
Table 2. Rotated factor matrix: Action intentions
Action against Support
Find out how to prevent this 0.711 0.489
Take action against the proposal 0.763 0.492
Don’t want to do anything (recoded) 0.900 0.061
Show support for the State House representatives 0.032 0.917
Support the proposal 0.373 0.838
Show sympathy for the out-of-state students 0.569 0.507
Note: Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method: Varimax.
Figure 3. Taking action against proposal as a function of identiﬁcation and categorization
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Mediation of Anger by Unfairness
To examine whether the combined effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on anger was mediated
by the appraisal that the proposal was unfair, we performed several regression analyses. In line with
predictions, we found that the interaction effect on anger was no longer statistically signiﬁcant,
¼0.08, t¼0.89, p¼ 0.38, when the appraisal that the proposal was unfair was added as a
predictor. The Sobel (1982) test also proved statistically signiﬁcant, z¼ 2.53, p< 0.05. Importantly,
the appraisal of unfairness continued to predict anger, ¼ 0.57, t¼ 5.96, p< 0.01. Such a pattern is
strongly indicative of the presence of mediated moderation.
To further ascertain the nature of the process, we looked at a competing model in which anger
mediates the impact of the interaction of categorization and identiﬁcation on the appraisal of
unfairness. As it turns out, the interaction effect still tended to inﬂuence the appraisal of the proposal
being unfair, ¼0.16, t¼  1.73, p< 0.09, when anger was entered in the model even though anger
was found to predict unfairness, ¼ 0.55, t¼ 5.96, p< 0.001. As a set, these data indicate that the
interactive effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on anger was mediated by the appraisal of
unfairness rather than the other way around.
Mediation of ‘Taking Action Against’ by Unfairness and Anger
To examine whether the interactive effect of our independent variables on taking action against the
proposal was mediated by anger through unfairness, we performed several regression analyses. First,
we found that the interaction effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on taking action against was no
longer statistically signiﬁcant, ¼0.13, t¼  1.34, p< 0.19, when unfairness was added as a
predictor. In this case, unfairness continued to predict taking action against, ¼ 0.47, t¼ 4.80,
p< 0.01. Importantly, the Sobel test proved statistically signiﬁcant, z¼ 2.41, p< 0.05.
Second, we found that the interaction effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on taking action
against was no longer statistically signiﬁcant, ¼0.09, t¼  1.23, p< 0.22, when anger was added
as a predictor. In this case, anger predicted taking action against, ¼ 0.68, t¼ 8.83, p< 0.01. The
Sobel test was again statistically signiﬁcant, z¼ 2.10, p< 0.05.
Finally, anger was added as a predictor in a model containing our independent variables and
their interaction along with unfairness. In this model, both the interaction effect, ¼0.08,
t¼  1.04, p< 0.30, and the effect of unfairness, ¼ 0.13, t¼ 1.31, p< 0.19, were no longer
statistically signiﬁcant whereas anger predicted taking action against the proposal, ¼ 0.61,
t¼ 6.46, p< 0.01.
Figure 4. Showing support of proposal as a function of identiﬁcation and categorization
Group-based emotions, victims, and perpetrators 25
Copyright# 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 36, 15–30 (2006)
As a set, these ﬁndings suggest that the interactive effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on
taking action against the proposal was mediated by the emotional experience of anger, which in turn
was mediated by the appraisal of unfairness.
Mediation of ‘Showing Support’ by Unfairness and Anger
To examine whether the interaction effect of our independent variables on showing support for the
proposal was mediated by anger through unfairness, we performed several regression analyses. First,
we found that the interaction effect on showing support was no longer statistically signiﬁcant,
¼0.05, t¼0.56, p< 0.58, when unfairness was added as a predictor. In this model, unfairness
predicted showing support, ¼0.69, t¼  8.43, p< 0.01. The Sobel test proved statistically
signiﬁcant, z¼ 2.65, p< 0.01.
Second, we found that the interaction effect on showing support was no longer statistically
signiﬁcant, ¼0.14, t¼  1.51, p< 0.14, when anger was added as a predictor whereas, anger
continued to predict showing support, ¼0.51, t¼  5.44, p< 0.01. The Sobel test conﬁrmed the
mediational role of anger, z¼ 2.01, p< 0.05.
Finally, when anger was added as a predictor in a model containing our independent variables and
their interaction along with unfairness, the interaction effect (¼0.03; t¼0.36, p< 0.72) was no
longer statistically signiﬁcant, but both unfairness (¼0.58, t¼  5.97, p< 0.01) and anger
(¼0.20, t¼2.12, p< 0.05) continued to predict showing support of the proposal. This pattern
suggests that the interactive effect of categorization and identiﬁcation on showing support for the
proposal was mediated by both the appraisal of unfairness and anger.
Identiﬁcation with Being a Student and with being a State Resident
We also analyzed identiﬁcation with both groups measured at the end of the questionnaire. The three
State identiﬁcation items were combined in a scale as the reliability analysis revealed that the internal
consistency was good (Cronbach’s ¼ 0.81). The three student identiﬁcation items were also
combined in a scale as the reliability analysis revealed that the internal consistency was satisfactory
(Cronbach’s ¼ 0.66). The two identiﬁcation scales were positively and statistically signiﬁcantly
related, r (82)¼ 0.32, p< 0.01. Thus, people who are likely to strongly identify with being a resident
from their State are also likely to strongly identify with being a student.
DISCUSSION
The present study aimed at testing a series of important predictions that both replicate and add new
evidence and insights to our earlier work on group-based emotions (for a review, see Yzerbyt et al.,
2002). First, we wanted to replicate our earlier ﬁndings regarding the impact of the contextual salience
(Gordijn et al., 2001) and an individual’s chronic attachment (Yzerbyt et al., 2003) to social categories
on the emergence of group-based emotions and intentional behaviors. When people were led to see
themselves as belonging to the same category as the victims, they were more inclined to report
experiencing anger when they were strongly rather than weakly attached to the category that includes
themselves and the victims. The same pattern held for the behavioral intentions. More action against
the proposal initiated by the perpetrators was found when participants saw themselves in the same
category as the victims and identiﬁed strongly rather than weakly with this category.
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An important new message of the present study is that the same situation could also be experienced
from the point of view of the perpetrators, with a different experience of group-based emotions as a
consequence. That is, participants who saw themselves in the same category as the perpetrators by way
of the experimental manipulation and had initially expressed strong identiﬁcation with this category
showed a pattern of emotions and behavioral reactions that is likely to be found among the actual
perpetrators. Speciﬁcally, when the context stressed membership to the same category as perpetrators,
participants were less likely to believe the proposal was wrong and they seemed to experience less
anger when they identiﬁed more as opposed to less with the group. Moreover, support for the proposal
initiated by the perpetrators was found when participants saw themselves in the same category as the
perpetrators and identiﬁed strongly rather than weakly with this category.
Interestingly, our data are not only in line with our previous ﬁndings regarding the role of contextual
salience of social categorization and the chronic identiﬁcation to social identities on emotions and
behavioral intentions. They also conﬁrm and extend our ﬁndings regarding the mediating role of
emotions on behavioral intentions (see Yzerbyt et al., 2003). In the current research, we found that
anger was the emotion that mediated the impact of categorization and identiﬁcation on the intention to
take action against and show support for the behavior of the perpetrators.
An important asset of the present work is that we measured participants’ cognitive appraisal of the
harmful behavior in the various conditions. In line with the available work on appraisal theories of
emotion, such as Smith’s (1993) ideas regarding the emergence of group-based emotions, we found
that participants who were induced to see themselves and the victims as members of the same category
seemed to judge the proposal put forth by the perpetrators to be more unfair if they identiﬁed strongly
with this category. In sharp contrast, when participants were led to think of themselves as members of
the same category as the perpetrators they judged the proposal put forth by their fellow perpetrators to
be less unfair if they identiﬁed strongly with this category.
We also examined the mediating role of participants’ appraisal of the harmful behavior on the
emotion and behavioral intention as a function of categorization and identiﬁcation. As the model of
group-based emotions would predict, this appraisal mediated the inﬂuence of our independent variables
on our dependent variables. That is, the extent to which people wanted to take action against the
harmful behavior was dependent on whether their similarities to either one or the other category were
made salient combined with their identiﬁcation with this category. The interaction of these two factors
shaped a particular appraisal of the behavior, which in turn affected the extent to which they felt angry
about the proposal. Finally, the emotional experience inﬂuenced the behavioral intention.
A fairly similar path was obtained for the expression of support for the proposal, although both the
perception of unfairness and anger remained signiﬁcant mediators of the impact of participants’
appraisal of the behavior on the behavioral intention. Perhaps this difference between behavioral
intentions is caused by the different nature of just showing support versus actually doing something
about it. It is easy to say that you will show support for something. In this case, appraising something
as unfair might be enough to say you will not show support, while anger just adds something to this
intention. But if you really want to take action against something that you do not want to happen, you
have to be very angry. In this case, the cognitive appraisal of unfairness may not be enough to lead to
action. Action will only be taken if unfairness leads to the emotional experience of anger. Future
research should further examine these different kinds of behavioral intentions.
Although we did not measure any actual behaviors in the present study, the obtained pattern on
appraisals, emotions, and behavioral intentions as well as our previous work in which actual behaviors
were examined (Dumont et al., 2003) encourages us to conjecture that participants may indeed end up
acting very differently as a function of the contextual salience of similarities to one rather than another
of their social identities and the extent to which they identify with this salient social category (Yzerbyt,
in press).
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The present research focused on anger but we also measured other emotions. With respect to guilt
we found some interesting results. Our ﬁndings indicate that when similarities to perpetrators are
salient, anger and guilt are more related than when similarities to victims are salient. So, although
these participants manifested a pattern of anger that very much resembles the one found among those
participants who were associated with and felt strongly about the group of victims, there is a noticeable
difference between these two groups of participants. One reason might be that when similarities to
perpetrators are salient guilt will feed into anger. More research is needed to be more conclusive about
this issue, however. In the current research, anger rather than guilt was the center of attention.
Therefore, we did not measure speciﬁc action tendencies or appraisals with respect to this emotion.
Future research should also look more into the difference between the experience of group-based
guilt and shame. In our research we did not ﬁnd a difference between guilt and shame, although
previous research suggests that these emotions are quite different as they have, for example, different
action tendencies (see e.g. Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, in press; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, &
Barlow, 1996). For example, shame will stimulate people to hide from others, while guilt stimulates
people to repair their wrongdoings (or the wrongdoing of their group). However, this does not mean
that a situation could not cause people to experience these emotions at the same time. Moreover, as
Tangney et al. (1996) argue, ‘because our use of emotion language can be imprecise, both
psychologists and laypeople may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to differentiate these types of affective experiences’
(p. 1256). Although this makes these emotions difﬁcult to separate in research (e.g. see Smith &
Ellsworth, 1985), it might be worth including measures that better discriminate between these two
emotions in future work on group-based emotions.
All in all, the present data provide support for the idea that people’s social identity is a strong
determinant of their emotional experience and, in turn, inﬂuences their behavioral intentions. This
ﬁnding is in agreement with Smith’s (1993) theoretical proposal that membership in a social group
would exert a strong impact on people’s emotional reactions even though the event does not affect the
individual in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, the scenario we selected allowed observers to see themselves as
similar to the victims or the perpetrators. Technically speaking, the victims could only be out-of-sate
students and the actual perpetrators are the state representatives not the participants themselves. What
is especially interesting in our study is that people who are highly identiﬁed with students are also
people who are more likely to be highly identiﬁed with being a Colorado resident. Still, just focusing
their attention on similarities to either one of these groups is enough to result in a totally different
emotional response to the story we presented to them. It is only to the extent that the context induced
people to embrace larger social identities that connected them to either one of these two groups, and to
the extent that they felt a certain level of attachment to these identities, that they started to appraise the
situation in a certain way, experience the accompanying emotions, and contemplate a selected set of
behavioral responses.
The present work shows once again the key role of social identity in the way people appraise a
given behavior. This message is at the heart of an impressive body of research conducted under the
banner of self-categorization theory (e.g. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1988;
Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Interestingly, our studies provide a good
illustration that people’s social identity, as it is inﬂuenced by the immediate contextual factors as well
as more chronic levels of attachment, not only concerns issues of opinions, attitudes, and behaviors but
also emotional experiences. As such, our ﬁndings are in line with recent theorizing by Mackie, Smith,
and colleagues (for a collection, see Mackie & Smith, 2002).
That the speciﬁc interpretation of the same events with its host of consequences rests on such subtle
differences in the environment is one more illustration that people’s behavior may indeed take very
different paths for reasons that they may largely ignore (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Part of the
explanation may reside in the fact that people have little appreciation for the versatility and ﬂexibility
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of social identities. They would rather stick to the idea that they are always endorsing the same kind of
identity or that their behavior would hardly be affected by possible changes in identity. Obviously, and
as the present data reveal, this conviction hardly resists the analysis of scientiﬁc inquiry. It is our belief
that many scholars inside and outside the ﬁeld would do well in appreciating the fact that intergroup
relations may indeed be highly sensitive to factors that are often more under one’s control than what
one would like to think. Minor modiﬁcations to the way the social landscape is constructed can make
dramatic differences to how people react to events (Yzerbyt, in press). Our work aims at better
understanding the way politicians and other decision makers could take advantage of this fact to
promote tolerance and social harmony.
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